Introduction*
In the middle of the 1960s only one in every three Finnish workers was a union member. At present, the degree of unionization is more than 85 per cent, Sweden is the only country with a higher unionization rate. Finland has one large central confederation of unions primarily consisting of manufacturing workers. In addition, there are three confederations of unions representing mainly white-collar workers. The wage settlement procedure is highly centralized and synchronized. The period saw only four years when no central agreement was reached. In these years settlements were concluded at industry level. Given this background, it seems only natural to analyze the Finnish labour market within a bargaining framework.
In the literature, there are two prevailing ways of selecting empirical equations. 1 One makes explicit assumptions concerning the utility functions of unions, production functions etc. and estimates various structural parameters. This is the method applied by, inter alia, Pencavel (1985) , and Pencavel & Holmlund (1988) . A competing methods seeks merely to specify the relevant variables and to search for functional forms more or less on an ad hoc basis. The latter approach is fol1owed by, inter alia, Bean & Layard & Nickel1 (1986) and Calmfors & Forslund (1990) and is also fol1owed here.
The Madel
An exampIe of the derivation of wage and empIoyment equations under strictIy specified assumptions is introduced in Appendix 1. Hence, only a brief description of the model and its underlying characteristics is given here. There are n identicaI firms which have constant returns to scaIe (Cobb-Douglas) production functions, F(L, M, K), with three inputs, Iabour (L), raw materiaIs (M) and capitaI (K). CapitaI stock is taken as predetermined. Any investment undertaken during the period only influences the capitaI stock for the next period. Imperfect competition prevaiIs in the product market. The firm maximizes profits which are defined as the difference between saIes revenue and production costs:
where Q = p-l(p)Z-l == D(P)Z is a downward sloping demand curve of the separabIe form introduced by Nickell (1978, p. 21) . Z is a paratpeter describing the position of the demand curve faced by the firm and P = producer price of the firm, P =competitors' producer prices, W = nominal consumer wages, 't1~payroll taxes, Pm =prices of raw materiaIs (incl. energy), and Q =output of the firm which is endogenous.
According to the marginal product condition, optimal use of inputs is determined by their reIative prices. In so far as the firm uses raw materiaIs optimally we can derive the following standard aggregate labour demand function Z 
In an organized Iabour market the firm bargains with a union. The weIfare of a utiIitarian union depends on the after tax reaI wage of its empIoyed members and unemployment benefit received by the unempIoyed members. Hence, its utiIity function is U = U(W(l-'t Z )/Pc,L,B) where Pc =consumer prices, 'tZ =income taxes, and B =repIacement ratio (unemployment benefit in reaI terms).
There are severaI commonly used union models. They differ as regards the factors which are assumed to be bargained over. In the lfright-to-manage lf model wages are bargained over and the profit maximizing firm sets employment unilaterally. The game is specified as a standard Nash solution of a cooperative game after Binmore et al. (1986) : max(U -Q)/3(Jt -z0 1 -/3
where w is the real wage (W/PJ and~refers to the bargaining power of unions. U is the fall-back utility of the union in the event an agreement is not reached. In Finland, the relevant alternative for an agreement is a strike not only in economy-wide but in loeal negotiations as well. So, U is assumed to depend on strike allowances, U = U(S). 1t is the fall-back profit which reflects fixed costs during a produetion stoppage. When 1t is dedueted from 1t in (iii), fixed eosts caneel out. For simplicity, fixed costs were already omitted from (i) above. Equation (iii) gives monopoly union model, and efficient bargaining model as special cases.
As a marked reduetion in normal annual working time has oeeurred in Finland during our observation period, we feel that this matter should not be disregarded. Generally, the effeet of shorter working time on wages and employment is theoretieally not clear. Holmlund (1989) stresses the sensitivity of the results to assumptions about how working time is initially determined. So, the question of how wages and employment are effected by shorter reqular working time is ultimately empirical. Our model does not give quidanee in this respect.
The model below for equilibrium (real) wages eonsists of variables influencing profits, on the one hand, and the utility or the union, on the other hand. In addition a role is played by determinants of the fall-back utilities of the parties. Finally, the relative bargaining power matters. In its most general form, the model is
where H N =normal working hours, and t =technical progress. Indirect taxes (= 't3) are part of Pc/P. In modelling the determination of real wages and employment we follow the tradition of Nickell & Andrews (1983) and Layard & Nickell (1986) , despite obvious differences in specifications. The employment equation is commonly estimated in structural form like (ii) above with the real wage on the right-hand side. We prefer, however, to work with reduced forms as in Carruth, Oswald & Findlay (1986) . This is mainly in order to avoid simultaneity. For this reason we replaced W in equation (ii) with (iv). The resultin~equation consists of the same variables as wage equation (iv) -? ?
Our aim is not to question the existence of a labour demand curve. When the employment equation was estimated in structural form (ii), with W/Pc on the right-hand side instrumented with variables indicated by (iv), a negative effect of wages on the use of labour was found. In tms article we wish, however, to evaluate whether the data provides support for the assertion that in the longer run both wages and employment -and basically the combination of the two -adjust towards an equilibrium determined by the exogenous factors of the bargaining modeI. 5 Discrimination between bargaining models and other models is not straightforward. For instance, market clearing models can be specified so that they produce equations which are very much like those above (see Tyrväinen (1988a) ). The role of bargaining power is, however, the distinguishing feature of bargaining models. In right-to-manage model the impact of union power on employment is negative. The same is true for monopoly union modeI. In time-series estimations, discrimination of the 3 The unemployment variable eould have been introdueed as a faetor influencing the bargaining power of unions, for example. It was, however, eonsidered inconvenient to have an unemployment variable sueh as ((Ls-Ld)/l"s) in an equation explaining employment, L d . In so far as there are rigidities in labour supply, L S , artificial explanatory power eould have resulted. As we preferred to work with identieal reduced forms for both wages and employment, unemployment was omitted not only from employment equation but from the wage equation as well. 4 Peneavel & Holmlund (1988) let employment to depend on (lagged) aetual hours. We, instead, use the normal hours. If eeteris paribus higher aetivity leads to higher employment as well as to more overtime work a positive relation between hours and employment emerges. If hours are adjusted more flexibly than heads, probability of this relation inereases. If, however, eeteris paribus regular working time is reduced (by legislation), the share of overtime inereases implying higher average unit labour eost. This may make it profitable for the firm to hire more workers each of whom works less hours. In this ease a negative relation between employment and hours eould be deteeted. As Tyrväinen (1988a) shows, aetual hours and regular hours have developed very mueh differently in Finland. This is why we eonsider skeptically any results reeeived in regressing employment on actual hours at least in the context of Finland. It is interesting to note that in different regressions Peneavel & Holmlund find first a negative and then a positive coefficient in Sweden. monopoly union model is problematie as the union power is by definition eonstant (= unity) over time. Of eourse, even when a union aets as a monopolist unionization rate may vary when membership and employment do not ehange equiproportionally. Specifications with positive union effeet on employment are also eommon in the literature (see Manning (1987) and Moene (1988) , e.g.).
When the model in Appendix is solved under the assumption of perfeet eompetition on the product market, the demand shift variable drops out (see Tyrväinen (1988a) ). Henee, a significant presenee of a variable deseribing aggregate eeonomic aetivity would give support to the hypothesis of monopolistie eompetition. "It is this ehannel that distinguishes this model from the eompetitive special case, and eonsequently the seareh for the signifieant presence for aggregate demand variables is an important aspect of their empirieal implementation" (Andrews (1987) , p. 6).
Estimating Equations
Equations (iv)-(v) are assumed to determine the target levels implied by error correction models. The two-stage procedure presented by Engle & Granger (1987) is applied. The estimation period is 1965Ql-1989Q4. Mainly series of the Bank of Finland Quarterly Model of the Finnish Economy, BOF4, were used for the two sectors: 1) private sector, excl. agriculture and forestry, and 2) manufacturing industry. 6 As wage settlements are concluded more or less simultaneously in Finland, there are peaks in the wage series in the contract quarters. This institutional feature is taken into account by means of a multiplicative dummy, DCONT.
Finally, we are ready to write the estimating wage equations. The employment equations are analogous. AlI 
where Zw t-1 is the lagged residual of the level equation and b 13 < O.
The ct'ynamics in error correction equations is determined freely. Four lags of all variables are included and biCL) summarizes the relevant lag polynomials. Definitions of the variables are in Appendix 2.
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Having assumed monopolistic competition in the product market, a variable (Z) is required which determines the location of the downward sloping demand curve. Pencavel & Holmlund (1988) use household disposable income for this purpose. However, income is by and large a product of wages, on the one hand, and employment, on the other. Moreover, its third key component, the tax rate, is one of the right-hand side variables in our model. On the other hand, in so far as instantaneous adjustment is assumed to take place on the product market variations in inventories are abstracted away and aggregate output (Q) could be a suitable proxy of the aggregate demand especially in the long run equations.
Generally speaking, there are many unresolved questions concerning the appropriate choice of the demand shift variable (see Holmlund (1989) ). This is why we report alternative regressions. First, output is used. Second, the real disposable income of households is used as in Pencavel & Holmlund (1988) . Finally, instrumentai variable techniques have been used. In addition to exogenous variables of the mode!, we instrument output with imports of the countries important to Finnish exports and government real expenditure. For manufacturing industry we also include export prices of goods. The observed output is tracked well with the instruments chosen.
In conditions of imperfect competition, the endogenous pricing decisions of a firm are infiuenced by the (exogenous) prices of competitors. In aggregation over identical firms, the counterpart of competitors' producer prices is the aggregate producer price of the industry concerned. This is a fairly typical result of aggregation. A test of the Granger-causality (see Tyrväinen (1989b) ) does not reject models where producer price and ou~ut are considered as exogenous with respect to wages and employment. 7 , The proxy chosen for union power is the unionization rate, UNION. In Finland, the picture given by the unionization rate closely corresponds to the qualitative conception of changes in union strength although the former is undoubtedly only a rough measure of the latter. 9 The size of strike allowances is determined on a case-by-case basis in Finland. Hence, it is not possible to construct a uniform time series for it.
Short-term post-sample forecasts simulated with equations similar to those in this paper were introduced in Tyrväinen (1989b) . The actual outcome was tracked well with one exception. The actual number of persons employed in 1985 was 20 000 (around 1 per cent) less than predicted by the model. A survey (Borg (1988) ) suggests that firms reacted strongly by reducing recruitment when a law improving employees' security against dismissal came into effect on 1 September 1984. It was indicated that as many as 20 000-30 000 jobs were involved. So, the results of our early forecasting exercise and the survey accord with each other. In this paper we include a dummy, DISD, in the employment equation to evaluate the matter more thoroughly.
The two-stage procedure of Granger & Engle makes use of the notion that a set of time series can form a stationary system as a linear combination, although separately the time series are not stationary. How about the time series of this study? Can they be made stationary, and if so, how many times must each series be differentiated in order to achieve stationarity? Table Al in Appendix 3 presents the result of an ADF-test. It is clear from the table that we have a mixture of 1(1) and 1(2) variables in our regressions. This will be kept in mind when the results are evaluated.
Cointegrating Regressions
The first stage of the Granger & Engle procedure, level-form equations, is reported in Tables 1 and 2 . The estimation period is generally 1965Ql-1989Q4. 1n choosing the preferred equations -marked with a star, * -the size of the standard error has not been the sole criteria. More general features of the equations have been evaluated as well.
The CRDW and ADF test statistics of all the relevant equations below exceed the critical levels known at the 1 per cent significance level (see Hall (1986) , Engle & Yoo (1987) and Blangiewicz et al. (1990) ). The cointegration hypothesis can be accepted without problems. Tyrväinen (1988a Tyrväinen ( , 1988b report regressions which are similar to those reported in this paper with an observation period which was 5 years (20 observations) shorter than here. The qualitative results are not effected by the length of the estimation. 1n addition, the cointegration regressions below were also carried out so that the more recent observations were given more weight than tho~e located in the more distant past. When all the series were multiplied by the unionization rate, the results differed only slightly from those reported in Tables 1-2. The conclusion was exactly the same with a shorter estimation period (Tyrväinen (1988a) ). As the unionization rate rose from 33 per cent in 1965 to more than 85 per cent in the middle of 1980's, these results as well provide evidence for the stability of the equations. 10g (0) 10g (YD) log (UNION) 10g ( CPI =consumer price index, P =producer prices, Pm =import prices of raw materials and semifinished products (incL energy), TOT = terms of trade = P/Pm where P x = export prices of goods and services (export prices of goods only for manufacturing industry), P h = prices of dwellings, '&1 = employers' social security contributions, '&2 = marginal rate of income taxes, 0 = output, YD = households' real disposable income, UNION =UIN = unionization rate, K = capital stock, K&TlME which measures the contribution to the productivity of capital stock and technical progress is (K**OA088)*EXP(O.o0582*TlME) in the private sector. In manufacturing it is (K**0.3658)*EXP(0.OO811 *TIME). B = unempIoyment benefits, DSTAB is a stabilization policy dummy which receives the vaIue of one in 196802-197004, and is 0 elsewhere.
In equations (3) and (8) output (0) has been instrumented. Other independent variables of the equation have been used as instruments. Additional instruments are government real expenditure and imports of countries important for Finnish exports. 1n manufacturing industry export prices of goods are among instruments as wel!.
Wages
In the level-form regressions of wages, the signs of the coefficients of all key variables correspond to our a a priori expectations. Also, they are highly significant by usual criteria. Higher income taxes add to wage pressures although not with a one-to-one impact. A rise in employers' social security contributions is shifted partly backwards to lower wages. 10 Indirect taxes ('t3) contribute to the divergence in deflators relevant for employees and employers. An increase in the relative price between consumption and production (Pc/P) only partly lowers consumption real wages, and hence, higher labour costs result. The data rejects the wedge restriction which would imply that the coefficients of factors contributing the wedge «1 +"(1)' (1-'t2)' (Pc/P)) are equal in absolute value. The impact of relative import prices of raw materials is small which could be expected because of their small import share.
The proxy for union power, the unionization rate, is of special interest for us. Hs coefficient is positive in al1 wage equations, in the range 0.1-0.3, and highly significant by the usual criteria. An inverse effect of the normal working hours on the wage level implying that total earnings do not drop hand in hand with hours worked was found in all regressions. As the coefficient was quite imprecisely defined, however, it was left out from the final equations. The positive wage effect of unemployment benefits implied by the bargaining model is clearcut in the private aggregate sector As already discussed, three alternative ways to introduce the effect of the product demand were experlmented with. As the Table shows, the results are not sensitive to the choice in concern. The equations are almost unchanged also when unionization rate is instrumented with its past values and other exogenous variables of the model.
One of the most interesting findings of this study concerns operationalization of the price deflator, Pc' relevant to the union. Tyrväinen (1989b) estimated wage equations for 1971Ql-1984Q4 and used the deflator of private consumption stemming from the National Accounts. When the estimation period was prolonged this measure appeared to be inappropriate. When the deflator was replaced by the consumer price index (ePI) the results of the earlier study were restored. This deserves some comments. To begin, the deflator is the more comprehensive measure but this quarterly series is published with a 10 Ingberg (1984) estimates that social security contributions influence wages with a weight of about one quarter. Ingberg applies the approach of Holmlund (1983) , who obtains a result for Sweden according to which about half of an increase in social security contributions is transmitted to wages within a year's time. This is the short-run effect. Holmlund points out that in the longer term employees will probably bear the burden in full (op. cit. p. 13). Ingberg's results should also be interpreted as short-run effects. A long-run coefficient of -0.7 can be solved from his various equations. considerable time lag. As the CPI which is montWy series is published with a lag of one month only its use appears to be more straightforward for the wage setters.
In addition, there are substantial differencies in the way of calculating the deflator and the CPI. For the present discussion the most important point refers to how the cost of housing is measured. When the new CPI (1985=100) was introduced in 1988 the most significant revision concerned the measurement of housing costs. Ralf of housing expenses is now considered to arise from capital costs, of which depreciation accounts for two-thirds. The weight of the latter is 4.8 percentage points in the CPI. The "cost" of depreciation is calculated by multiplying the replacement value of the dwelling by a constant depreciation coefficient. The replacement value follows movements in house prices. As prices of dwellings rose by more than 60 per cent from 1987Q3 to 1989Ql a sizeable gap between the two price measures emerged which also generated additional wage claimes on the union side.
In equation (1)- (3), (6)- (7) and (10) the real prices of dwellings, however, play an independent role. This could indicate that unions give an even larger weight to house prices than the epI. This conclusion is, however, complicated by the fact the Finnish economy was heavily overheated in 1988-1989. There were two reasons for that. The liberalization of the financial markets lead to a credit boom and, simultaneously, the terms-of-trade improved substantially. The first of these factors is difficult to measure whereas the latter is more straightforward.
We have proxied above the strength of demand with the output variable. Because of capacity constraints excessive demand, however, largely boosted imports which lead to a deterioration of the current account. So, output obviQusly underestimates the product demand in [1988] [1989] . It may well be that the housing prices capture this effect. To evaluate this we replaced the relative price term Pm/P by Px/Pm or the terms-of-trade in equations (4) and (9). Consumer goods were excluded from the import prices as before. In addition, export prices of services were excluded when manufacturing sector was concerned. In the resulting equations the real housing price lost its explanatory power. This appears to indicate that the term in concern at least partly captures the demand effects discussed above.
Bargaining models imply an equilibrium relation between real wages and employment. First order homogeneity in our wage equations appears to hold in [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . The devaluation of the Finnish Markka with more than 30 per cent in 1967 and the stabilization policies in 1968-1970, however, substantially influenced the price-wage relation in [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] . Accordingly, the first order homogeneity conjecture is rejected as far as the second half of the 1960's is concerned.
Employment
Employment can be measured by two different concepts, the number of employed persons and the number of hours worked. If hours per head change, these two series may differ from each other. Changes may be due to not only cyclical variation in economic activity but also to legislation and agreements concerning normal working hours. Employment measured in time units (hours) appears to be closer to the concept relevant for the production function, the profit function and household income. From the point of view of economic poliey, the number of employed persons is the key variable. Equations have been estimated for both heads (N) and hours (H).l1
As the results can be found in the table, we only comment on them briefly here. The negative effect of employers' social security contributions on employment was discovered in the aggregate private sector. This is in accordance with the wage equations, according to which an increase in the payroll tax is only partly shifted backwords to lower real wages. Similarly, an increase in CPI/P which includes the effect of indirect taxes reduces employment. This infiuence appears to be larger in manufacturing industry than in the aggregate private sector.
The coefficient of normal working hours was negative in all regressions. This implies that shorter normal working time may have induced an increase -albeit modest -in the number of employed persons. 12 The effect is, however, small and the coefficient varied considerably from one equation to another. This is why we have omitted normal hours from the reported equations.
In general, the equations are not sensitive to the choice of the demand shift variable. The output elasticity of employment is, however, fairly low in comparison with conventional results. This is because we are dealing with reduced-form equations where employment is not explained by wages. If an exogenous increase in product demand raises wages, the adjustment required for employment is smaller than in the conventional structural form equations. Finally, technical progress has reduced the amount of labour needed for a given level of output. .0343 CPI = consumer price index, P = producer prices, p.. = import prices of raw materials and semifinished products (inel. energy), P, = prices of dwellings,1: 1 = employers' social securily contributions, ,;, = marginai rate of income taxes, 0 = output, YO = households' real disposable income, UNION = unionization rate, K = capitaI stock, K&TIME which measures the contribution to the produetivity of capital stock and technical progress is (K u O.4088)*EXP(0.00582*TIME) in the private sector. In manufacturing it is (K u O.3658)*EXp(O.OO811*TIME). ON is a dummy referring to a ehange in statistics and is 1 in 196501-197504, and 0 elsewhere. DISD is a dummy referring to an act improving workers' security against dismissals. It is 1 from 198404 onwards and is 0 elsewhere.
In equations (13), (16), (19) and (22) outpul (0) has been inslrumented. Other independent variables of the equation have been used as instruments. Additional instruments are governmenl real expendilure and imports of countries important for Finnish exports. In manufacturing industry export prices of goods are among instruments as well.
It was stated above that indirect evidence indicates that the law improving employees' security against dismissal since 1984 have reduced the recruitments. A dummy taking account of this is a key r-h-s variable in all employment equations. The negative impact would have involved around 1.5 per cent of the private sector employees or approximately 20 000-25 000 persons. In manufacturing industry the relative effect appears to be even larger. This is in accordance with earlier evidence. Stronger unions apRear to have increased employment in the manufacturing industry.13,14 When reviewing the entire private sector, union power obtained a (positive) coefficient close to zero. One although not necessarily the only way to interprete this is to argue that outside the manufacturing industries the union effect on employment would have been negative as the right-to-manage model implies.
The positive employment impact found for Finnish manufacturing contradicts the right-to-manage hypothesis. In the literature, there are several sources for evaluations concerning this result. The generalized model in Manning (1987) analysis the bargaining as a sequential process where the union's influence on wages and employment may be different. In our context the change in union influence on employment may have overruled that on wages. As there are no signs of bargaining over employment on aggregate level this is more attempting interpretation than the one implied by the efficient bargaining model. On the other hand, in a slightly different set-up than ours Moene (1988) shows that an increase in the bargaining power of the union leads to higher employment whenever work stoppages are used as threats in the Nash solution (iii) above. As discussed above, in Finland this argument could be relevant. Finally, if one wishes to verify the favourable effects of increasing "corporatism" (see Calmfors & Driffill (1988) ) in an empirical context, Finland would be an obvious candidate. There is hardly any other industrialized economy where the characteristics of the labour market have changed so much since the middle of the 1960s.
The explanatory power of equations for hours worked remains clearly weaker than that of the wage and employment equations. This is due to strong quarterly variation which occurs although the series have been seasonally adjusted. The coefficients are in general close to those obtained for employment. The union impact on hours is negative in the aggregate private sector and zero in manufacturing.
Error Correction Equations
In the second stage of the Granger & Engle procedure an ECM is regressed where the lagged residual of the level-form equation determines the long-run properties of the system. No restrictions are imposed on dynamics. The initially overparametrized ECM is simplified and reparametrized step by step until a parsimonious presentation of the data generating process is achieved (see e.g. Hendry (1986» .  Table A2 in Appendix 3 reports the parsimonius error correction equations. The top of the table indicates the level-form regression with which the difference equation is connected. An example of the initial overparametrized error correction equations is reported in Tyrväinen (1988a) .
According to Granger ((1986), p. 217) "Data generated by an error correction model ... must be cointegrated". In this respect, it is noteworthy that the error correction term is highly significant in all our equations. Its magnitude should, however, not be considered as the sole indicator of the speed of adjustment implied by the equation in concern. The dynamics is generated through various channels. In addition to the lagged residual, the contemporary and the lagged coefficients of the shock variable matter as do also the lags of the dependent variable. To evaluate the properties of these error correction equations, simulation of step response functions is required. 15 The convergence is obtained as the difference between the shock solution and the control solution.
Dynamic simulations produced fairly well-behaving paths as can be seen in Figure 1 . As far as real wages are concerned the speed of adjustment varies. In some cases the adjustment has by and large taken place within 1 1/2 years whereas is some cases the process is still going on in the third or even fourth year. However, most of the adjustment has generally taken place during the first two years. It is of special interest that inflating only appears to lead to a short-lived and minor reduction in real wages. Figure 1. Step response functions simulated for real wages and employment
The figures show the adjustment paths obtained by means of dynamic simulation after a shock has been fed into the system. The shock was induced as a permanent shift of 10 per cent in the level of an explanatory variable in 1990Q1. The simulations which concern private sector are based on equations (1) & (25), and (11) (l-'tZ) .. . .
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Employment appears to adjust slightly faster than real wages. 16 The effects of shocks are largely transmitted within one year and the adjustment has fully taken place within two years. Figure 2 presents the level-form wage equation (1), its error term and the fit of the error correction equation (25). Attention is drawn to the excellent explanatory power of the error correction equation. The high significance level of the error correction term additionally confirms that the error correction hypothesis is well adapted to the Finnish wage dynamics.
Figure 3 introduces the fit of the level-form regression (11) for employment as measured by heads. The residual and the ECM equation (28) are shown below. It can be seen that the actual employment was overestimated in the latter half of the 1970s which was a period of record tight economic policy. The residual confirms the casual evidence of labour hoarding in 1976. Subsequently, a counter effect materialized after economic policy had been sharply tightened. Equilibrium was restored only in 1980. Otherwise, the level-form regression tracks the aetual employment well and the standard error is small. Also, the error eorreetion equation works quite nieely.
It is sometimes c1aimed that the use of the two-stage estimation procedure is dubious. In an early simulation study Banerjee et. aI. (1986) argue that the superconsistency property of the eoefficients in the first-stage cointegration regression shows up only poorly in small samples. Based on more recent Monte-Carlo simulations, Phillips & Hansen (1990) state that "the reverse is true" (p. 120). Asymptoties are not only relevant but also seem to provide good approximations even for samples as small as 50.
Doubts have been east on the cointegration tests as well (see Oxford Bulletin of Economies and Statistics, VoI. 48, No. 3, Special Issue on Cointegrated Variables). New light is, however, shed by Blangiewicz & Charemza (1990) on the small sample properties of the ADF test in a multivariate case. Here, the critical values related to the ADF cointegration test do not differ much from the earlier estimates. As far as our test results are concerned, none of them is effeeted.
A final eomment related to the robustness of the results eoneerns the fact that we have both 1(1) and 1(2) variables in the regressions. Thus, it could be thought that some 1(2) variables on the right-hand side form a linear combination which is 1(1). It may be reasonable to argue that Q is 1(2) because K is 1(2) via the produetion function. Whether these kind of relations will appropriately work their way through in estimations deserves special attention when the coefficient estimates are evaluated. Figure 3a .
Employment equation in levels (11), private sector
Actual Fitted 1970 1975 1980 1985 Residual ofthe equation above Figure 3b . As it happens the results are generally 1) in accordance with theoretical considerations, 2) do not contradict earlier evidence from Finland, 3) do make common sense, and finally 4) fit the data well. Hence, the potential problems discussed above appear not to emerge in this context.
The two-stage method is particularly useful when the equations examined are complicated. Especially when it is desired to determine the lag structure freely, the degrees of freedom are often too small for reliable unrestricted estimation of the coefficients of all variables -both in level and difference form -in a single ECM regression. When there are many multicollinear variables both in levels and in differences in a regression, the results are very sensitive even for small changes in the data matrix: not only the magnitudes but even the signs of coefficient estimates are fragile. 17 Hence, the common procedure whereby a two-stage estimation is checked by regressing an ECM in the traditionaI fashion in one stage may in some cases lead to false conclusions.
Conclusions
The model applied in this paper works well with one exception. Against our a priori expectations, in manufacturing industry stronger unions appear to have a positive effect not only on wages but on employment as well. Hence, the right-to-manage hypothesis is rejected as far as manufacturing industry is concerned. 18 As the union density rateused as the proxy for union power -is a key right-hand side variable we can draw a further conclusion. The result also rejects the monopoly union model, where the union power in wage determination is by definition (constantly) one. lf there were no variation in union power, it would be captured wholly by the intercept of the equation. This is especially so in Finland as union wages are applied for non-unionized workers as well.
The hypothesis of monopolistic competition in product markets gains support, since the demand shift factor -no matter how it is proxied -is a key explanatory variable. Higher income taxes add to wage pressures although not with a one-to-one impact. A rise in employers' social security contributions is shifted partly backwards to lower wages. Indirect taxes (t3) contribute to the divergence in deflators relevant for employees and employers. An increase in the relative price between consumption and production (Pc/P) only partly lowers consumption real wages, and hence, higher labour costs result. As an increase in the (tax) wedge is not fully absorbed by wages lower employment results. The data rejects the wedge restriction which would imply that the coefficients of factors contributing the wedge ((1 +t1)' (1-'(2)' (Pc/P)) are equal in absolute value. Higher import prices of raw materials and energy reduce both real wages and employment.
According to dynamic simulations adjustment lags are generally not particularly long. This implies that developments in actual employmentin so far as they are considered unfavourable -cannot be attributable primarily to "too slow" adjustment. 19 Rather it is the equilibrium which is inappropriate.
Appendix 1
As an exampIe, the derivation of the wage and employment equations with expIiciteIy defined functionaI forms is reported below. In addition to signs of the parameters severaI parameter restrictions are achieved. In the empiricaI work these restrictions are, however, not tested. Because the underlying specification includes a complicated set of joint hypothesis, the parameter restrictions for the regression equations become intractable in practice.
A three factor Cobb-Douglas technoIogy F(L,K,M) relates output to inputs of Iabour, capital and raw-materials. Gross production or the suppIy of commodities can be written as and Y is vaIue added which is
where 0 < a < 1, where 0 < a < 1
Here, A = Be(At)K(l-a). The explicit formula for gross production is received by substituting A and (2') to (1 '). That is (3')
The technoIogy in concern implies constant returns to scaIe as a + a(l-a) + (l-a) =1. TechnoIogical development is embodied in parameter t.
The price of gross production, producer price (P), can also be written as a weighted combination of the value added deflator (P y ) and the prices of commodities and semi-products (Pm):
(4') and accordingIy the vaIue added deflator is equal to
The profit of the firm is defined as the difference between its returns and production costs:
W includes payroll taxes. When substituting the vaIue added identity, P y Y =PQ -PmM, into (5'), we get an alternative expression for profits n = PyY -WL -C.
(5")
The firm stays in business onIy if its profits exceed an exogenousIy given minimum IevelnO' For an active enterprice n~nO' Let us assume that the threat point in the Nash-solution refers to a situation in which the firm gives up because this minimum profit condition has been violated. Here, the profit (= loss) equals constant production costs, n = -Co ln Finland, strike is the relevant alternative to an agreement. When the uncertainty aspect of a bargaining process is the risk of a breakdown in negotiations, a von Neumann-Morgenstern specification is a utility function consistent with the game in concern (see Binmore et al. (1986». The union maximizes a utilitarian welfare function. Its welfare depends on its members' after-tax real wage w and employment. Membership M is taken as exogenous. The utility function is
where is w a is the alternative wage of the members with no union job. For simplicity, we assume at the moment that when the bargaining breaks down, all the union members receive this alternative income and U =M·u(w a ). So, for the union the excess pay off over the threat payoff
Labour and raw-materials are used so that their reIative marginaI products equaI to their reIative prices, that is (7') According to (7'), the optimal use of raw-materials can be solved as
The firm sells its products on imperfectly competitive parkets. It optimizes with regard to the price of its own product, P, facing a well-behaved log-linear downward sloping demand curve, which is defined as:
-y where X = PYz 1,
Z is the shift parameter and P is the price of competitors. It is often assumed that the absolute vaIue of the price eIasticity of demand is greater than one, Y< -1. However, if the demand curve is kinked, it may be that -1 < Y< O. A similar result may occur due to aggregation, even when the firm is competitive. Hence, the eIasticity of demand in relation to prices can be anything between zero and (minus) infinity (See Layard & WaIters (1978) ).
The demand curve (9') gives us the following pricing rule:
As the technology is identicaI in all firms, the deflator of value added is, thus Equation (8') implying optimal use of raw-material inputs is substituted into price equation (11 '). The production function and the pricing rule can be used in writing the formula for profits (5")
. From this we solve the formula for the aa marginal product of labour, J'tL' In equilibrium, the firm operates on the labour demand curve, where nL = O.
For the sake of notational simplicity, we consider below a symmetric bargaining game. The parameter f3 measuring asymmetry in bargaining is discussed in length in Tyrväinen (1988a,b) where the implications of its introduction are analyzed (see also Manning (1987». The optimization exercise is carried out in terms of value-added (see Andrews (1987». According to the Nash cooperative solution the problem is as follows:
where eZ = (el(l-a+aa)fl+ a ) (l-a+aa),u+a-l
The optimization condition incorporates the right-to-manage hypothesis, according to which firms use labour optimally. Havin~solved the target wage, optimal employment is found by substituting W into the equilibrium condition above. In logarithmic form, the equations for equilibrium employment and wages are: Earlier in this section we concluded that y can get also values between (0, -1). In that case b 6 < 0.
In the text the wage equation is written for the consumption wage instead of the product wage. Account of this purely technical transformation has been taken as far as the signs are concerned.
DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF SERIES
The source is the data base of the quarterly model of the Bank of Finland (BOF4) if not otherwise inclicated. DCONT ::: "institutional" dummy which eaptures the c1irrerences in the quarterly timing of wage settlements in c1ifferent years. The sum of the quarterly dummies is one in each year. If the only rise in the year becomes effeetive at the beginning of March, the contract raises wages in the first quarter with a weight of 1/3 while 2/3 of the effect is observed in the wage index only in the second quarter. Our contract dummy (DCONT) obtains the value 0.333 in the first quarter and 0.666 in the second (see also Tyrväinen (1988a». 19) u 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(2) 1(1) 1(2) 1(2) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(2) 1(2) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1965Q2-1989Q4, except 1971Q2-1989Q4 in equation (27) 
